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approaches to systems theory
There is no consensus in systems theory as to the 
correct approach. Instead, we find a variety of ap­
proaches of which L. von Bertalanffy’s general sys­
tems theory (GST) is only one.
GST has its origins in the anti-reductionist claim of 
Bertalanffy in the 1920s that the domain of 
«organismic biology» was legitimate, that the or­
ganism was a system, and that the fundamental task 
of biology was the discovery of the laws of biological 
systems at all levels of organization. This initial in­
sight led Bertalanffy to conceive of GST.
It is important to realize that GST has gone 
through a process of development from its inception 
in the 1930s when, although concerned with the 
study of systems in general, it concentrated on the 
theory of open systems to the 1960s when it had 
become an interdisciplinary study which utilized, in 
addition to the theory of open systems, cybernetics, 
information theory, games theory, automata theory 
and decision theory.
Bertalanffy’s 1950 definition of general systems 
theory is:
a logico-mathematical field, the subject matter of which is the 
formulation and deduction of those principles which are valid for 
«systems» in general.1
While there are claims which are peculiar to GST, 
the various approaches to systems theory have in 
common the study of systems in general. The other 
approaches, however, are concerned, in addition to 
the study of systems in general, with the characteris­
tics of particular classes of systems.
Systems theory is found applied in the physical sci­
ences, the biological sciences, the social sciences, and 
in technology.
A problem concerning a social system cannot be 
solved by the inspection of part of the system but 
requires the systems approach. As Forrester puts it:
the intuitive solutions to the problems of complex social systems 
will be wrong most of the time.2
The systems approach appeared independently in 
the various branches of science. The originality and 
pervasiveness of the systems approach was pointed 
out by Bertalanffy:
...in the past centuries, science tried to explain phenomena by 
reducing them to an interplay of elementary units which could be 
investigated independently of each other. In contemporary mod­
ern science, we find in all fields conceptions of what is rather 
vaguely termed «wholeness».3
1. Bertalanffy, L. von (1950), «An Outline of General System 
Theory», Brit. J. for the Phil, of Sci., May, 1950, p. 139.
2. Forrester, J.W. (1969), Urban Dynamics, p. 110.
3. Bertalanffy, L. von (1950). op. cit.
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W. Weaver distinguished three stages in the de­
velopment of scientific analysis, namely, organized 
simplicity, unorganized complexity, and organized 
complexity, and Bertalanffy followed Weaver in 
this.4
Advance in human knowledge has resulted from a 
combination of the elementalist approach, i.e., 
searching for the «atoms» of an object, its ultimate, 
indivisible elements, and the integrative approach, 
i.e., searching for the wholeness properties of the ob­
ject. There are still cognitive situations in which the 
elementalist approach has a heuristic value. Advance 
has occurred within the tension of elementalism and 
integratism.5
We shall explore, following the example of I.V. 
Blauberg et al.,6 the interrelations of systems theory, 
functionalism, and structuralism and shall examine 
the logical, methodological and epistemological ques­
tions to which they give rise.
It is either held that systems theory is distinct from, 
but related to, functionalism, or that there are sys­
tems ideas in functionalism, or that functionalism is 
one of a number of approaches albeit an unde­
veloped approach, to systems theory. The systems 
approach is shared by systems theory, functionalism 
and structuralism. Comprehensive expositions of 
functionalism and structuralism will not be attempt - 
cd, but only points relevant to the discussion will be 
made. The application of systems theory to social 
reality requires the identification of systems7 and this 
presupposes the identification of relations and con­
nections which are system-forming, i.e., that produce 
the effect of wholeness. Provided that the relations 
and connections are system-forming, there is no re­
striction on the nature of the elements of the set 
standing in interrelations and constituting a system.
the logic of connections
Treating connection as a conjunctive concept has 
resulted in attempts at its explication being unsuc­
cessful. There are no universally accepted criteria for 
distinguishing between connections and relations. As 
the connections found in any one system are varied, 
the problem of how best to classify connections 
arises. The classification of connections is also a step 
towards the explication of this disjunctive concept.
4. Weaver, W.(1948), «Science and Complexity», Am. Scien­
tist, Voi. 36, 1948, 536-544.
5. Yudin, E. (1977) in Systems Theory, Blauberg, I.V. et al., p. 
16 et seq.
6. Blauberg, I.V. et al. (1977), op. cit.
7. Agreement on the concept of system has not been achieved. 
Two international symposia, the special seminar of the Centre
International de Synthèse of April 1956 and the Un esco sym­
posium of January 1959, failed to achieve agreement on the «most
adequate» meanings of the term.
Connections are sometimes regarded as «couplings» 
which are stronger than relations and there is a ten­
dency to seek stronger «couplings» in systems. O. 
Lange treats connections as unidirectional, i.e., if 
element Ei is linked to E2, it does not follow that ele­
ment E2 is linked with element E,.8
V.N. Sadovsky has classified connections as 
follows:9 1. interaction connections, subdivided into 
connections of properties and connections of objects. 
A special type of interaction connection is that found 
between individuals and also collectivities or social 
systems. These connections may be co-operative or 
conflicting; 2. genetic connections; 3. transformation 
connections; 4. structural connections; 5. functional 
connections; 6. developmental connections, i.e., con­
nections concerned with the replacement of one state 
of a developing object by another; 7. control connec­
tions, which may be either functional or developmen­
tal, the classification of which presupposes the expli­
cation of the concept of control. Control connections, 
being system-forming connections, constitute the 
most important type of connection in systems theory.
the logic of relations
The referent is the term from which the relation 
goes and the relatum is the term to which it goes.
According to the number of elements connected by 
a relation we have dyadic (binary), triadic (ternary), 
tetradic and other polyadic relations.
If a and h«are in the relation R» we write aRb. If 
aRb and bRc, then a Re, we have a transitive relation. 
If aRb and b Re. then not-aRc, we have an intransitive 
relation. If aRb and hRe, then «aRc» holds for some 
but not all of the a. b and e that are members of the 
field of R, we have a nontransitive relation.
A symmetric relation takes the form aRb if and 
only if not-hRa. An asymmetric relation takes the 
form aRb if and only if not-òRa. With a nonsymmet- 
ric relation «aRb» and «6Ra» hold for some but not 
all a and b that are members of the field of R.
A relation is reflexive where if the referent has it to 
something it must have it to itself, irreflexive 
(aliorelative) where if the referent has it to something 
it cannot have it to itself, nonreflexive where if the 
referent has it to something it may or may not have it 
to itself.
In the correlation of relations, i.e., the number of 
objects to which the referent or relation may be con­
nected by the given relation, we have a many-many 
relation, a many-one relation, a one-many relation, or 
a one-one relation.
8. Lange, O. (1965), Wholes and Parts.
9. Sadovsky, V.N. in Blauberg I.V. et al. (1977), op. cit., p. 140 
et seq.
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Internal and external relations. An internal relation 
is one that is internal to its terms, i.e., the terms 
would not be the things they are unless related to it. 
An external relation is one that is not internal to its 
terms. In another sense, the in temali ty of a relation 
depends on how its terms are described. At one ex­
treme, it is held that all of a thing’s properties are 
essential to its being what it is and that all its relations 
are thus internal to it. At the other extreme, it is held 
that none of a thing’s properties are essential to its 
being what it is and that no relations are internal to it.
A. J. Bahm maintains that every relation involvés 
both externality and internality, connection and sep­
aration, unity and plurality.10 He argues that to say 
that two things were only related externally would be 
to say that they were not related. According to this 
view, two things that are related form a whole, i.e., 
they at least share the same relation, and thus the 
relation is internal to that whole. Insofar as two 
things are two they are different from each other and 
the relation is external, being dependent on the two 
things being external to each other. A relation re­
quires two and only members (relata) between which 
the relation is established. Angyal recommends re­
stricting the term «relation» to two-term relations on 
the ground that complex relations are either reduci­
ble to two-term relations or, where they are not so 
reducible, e.g., «b is between a and c», they have the 
characteristics of systems.11 Before a relation can be 
established it is necessary to single out a property of 
the relata which serves as a basis of the relation.
the concept of system
It has been argued that the term «system» is used 
in spheres which are so diverse that it is clear that the 
term has different meanings.
V.N. Sadovsky maintains that a logical sign system 
and an organismic system cannot be regarded as var­
iants of the same concept.12 However, it could be 
argued that system is a disjunctive concept rather 
than a conjunctive concept.
«System» has been variously defined as: «an in­
tegral set of interconnected elements» (V.N. 
Sadovsky),13 «a set of elements standing in 
interrelations» (Bertalanffy),14 «a set of objects to­
gether with relationships between the objects and be­
tween their attributes» (A.D. Hall and R.E.
10. Bahm, A.J. (1969), «Systems Theory: Hocus Pocus or 
Holistic Science», General Systems, 1969.
1 1. Angyal, A. ( 1941 ), « A Logic of Systems» in Systems Think­
ing. Emery, F.E. (ed.), 1969.
12. Sadovsky, V.N. in Blauberg, V.I. et al. (1977),op. cit., pp. 
127-8.
13. Sadovsky, V.N. in Blauberg, V.I. et al. (1977),op. cit., p. 
128.
14. Bertalanffy, L. von (1971), General System Theory, p. 55.
Fagen),15 «set of interconnected elements function­
ing as a whole» (E. Yudin),16 «anything that consists 
of parts connected together» (St. Beer),17 «anything 
one wishes to study as an entity» (Blalock and 
Blalock).18 A system, unlike an aggregate or assem­
blage, is characterized by non-summativity of ele­
ments and possesses irreducible wholeness proper­
ties. Thus, social and cultural systems are charac­
terized by non-summativity and wholeness.
Angyal uses the term «system» to refer to the or­
ganization, i.e., the way of arrangement of parts and 
«whole» to refer to the organized object.19 There are 
set-theoretic definitions of «system», e.g., by M. 
Mesarovic, according to which a system is a set with 
relations. But it follows from this concept that every 
object is a system. While it is true that each decom­
position of a system represents a set, the system itself 
is not a set.
A. Uyomov’s concept of system employs the 
categories of objects m. properties P and relations R 
and a second-order relation between objects, proper­
ties and relations, namely, the order of transition 
from one category to another. A system, according to 
Uyomov, is a set of objects in which a previously 
specified relation with fixed properties is realized, or 
a set of objects possessing previously determined 
properties with fixed relations between them. Ac­
cording to A. Uyomov’s concept of system relativity, 
a specified set of elements is a system only with re­
spect to specified properties of and relations between 
the elements. The process of identification of a sys­
tem for a certain object is itself relative. In the 
generalized system conception a system is not a set. 
but the wholeness and hierarchical structure may be 
expressed through a class of various sets and connec­
tions between them.
Practically any object can be represented as a sys­
tem by identifying in it a set of elements, together 
with relations and interactions between them and in­
tegral characteristics. In the case of some objects 
there are no non-trivial tasks requiring such rep­
resentation, but the systems view of many complex 
objects opens up new possibilities for their study.
The systems study of an object is based on the 
identification of its wholeness properties, hierarchical 
structure and interconnectedness of its elements. It 
is necessary to distinguish between the study of a sys­
tems object, which may or may not involve the 
systems approach, and the systems study of the same
15. Hall, A.D. and Fagen, R.E. (1956), «Definition of 
System». General Systems. 1956, Voi. 1. p. 18.
16. Yudin, E. in Blauberg, V.I. et al. (1977), op. cit., p. 33.
17. Beer, St. (1959), Cybernetics and Management, p. 9.
18. Blalock, H.M. and Blalock A.B. (1959), «Toward a Clas­
sification of System Analysis in the Social Sciences», Phil. Sci., 
April, 1959, p. 84.
19. Angyal, A. (1941), op. cit.
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object. It is possible to construct different overlap­
ping sequences of relations and connections con­
stituting systems. As an object may be systematically 
described in different ways, each way involving dif­
ferent components, there is a risk of summing up 
uncoordinated results unless an integrated model of 
the system is first built for organizing the study of the 
system.20
A systemic element is only such in relation to a 
given system, and must be distinguished from the ul­
timate, indivisible elements of the elementalistic ap­
proach. The systemic elements are not considered 
separately but with respect to the system in and by 
which they are connected. The elements are not sig­
nificantly connected with each other, from a holistic 
viewpoint, except with reference to the system. It is 
not by means of their properties that the elements 
participate in the system but by means of their dis­
tribution or arrangement in the system.
weighting
There are degrees of systemness.21 There are de­
grees and types of connectedness and degrees and 
types of interdependence of systemic elements. A 
holon is a system which is at oncè a subsystem and a 
suprasystem.22 Holons differ in the degree and type 
of connectedness involved. V.E. Frankl remarked:
I doubt that several persons can merge and enter the holon of a 
nation to the same degree, the same extent, in the same sense as 
organs are participating in the wholeness of a human organism.23
There is the problem of weighting the differential 
contributions of the different elements to the system 
outcomes. Different elements make different con­
tributions to a particular system state and to changes 
in the system. Elements differ in their degree of func­
tional autonomy in relation to other elements and in 
relation to the system as a whole. As all these things 
are a matter of degree their study requires the use of 
quantitative methods. Parsons is opposed to the 
necessary weighting of systemic elements because of 
what he sees as the «plurality of possible origins of 
change».24 A.W. Gouldner, however, recommends 
the weighting of systemic elements.25
20. According to K.E.F. Watt: «...we must use a strategy of 
research which at every stage is designed in terms of the problem 
of fitting all the fragments together correctly at the end of the 
research program». He suggests designing the whole research 
programme in terms of a conceptual model. Watt. K.E.F. (ed.). 
Systems Analysis in Ecology. 1966.
21. See K. Popper (1972), «Of Clouds and Clocks», Objective 
Knowledge.
22. Koestler, A. in Beyond Reductionism, Koestler, A. and 
Smythies, J.R. (eds.) (1972), pp. 210-211.
23. Frankl, V.E. in Koestler, A. and Smythies, J.R. (1972), op. 
cit., p. 219.
24. Parsons, T. (1951), Social System, p. 494
25. Gouldner, A. W. (1970), The Coming Crisis in Western
Sociology, p. 226 et seq.
disequilibrium of system
A system may be in disequilibrium, with the struc­
tured conditions for the attainment or maintenance 
of the preferred state and with a constant lag between 
the new preferred state and the old structural ar­
rangements. A society’s normative inconsistency is 
sometimes, at least partially, accounted for by this 
disequilibrium. The assumption of a society’s norma­
tive consistency results not from a functionalist or 
systems approach but from the assumption of 
equilibrium.
structure of a system
The structure of a system consists of that which 
remains constant under the transformation of the sys­
tem. As Laszlo puts it:
These constancies and invariances furnish the systemic elements in 
reference to which theoretical structures can be built.26
Parsons defines «structure» as:
the features of the system which can, in certain strategic respects, 
be treated as constants over certain ranges of variation in the 
behavior of other significant elements of the theoretical problem.27
G. S. Scur uses the term «structure» to refer to the 
hierarchic set of related elements of an entity and the 
term «system» to refer to the hierarchic set of con­
nections among the elements of structure.28
time and systems
Analysis does not involve the concept of time in 
general, but that of the specific time of the system.
The distinction between historical time and the 
time of functioning is based on the distinction be­
tween respective temporal scales. Historical time is 
different for different systems and different segments 
of evolution may be covered in chronologically iden­
tical time spans. Inner historical time has its own 
units of measurement which are related to changes in 
structure. The time of functioning takes as its unit of 
measurement the realization of a definite function, or 
a set of interconnected functions. In both historical 
and structural analysis, we may be concerned with 
the time of reproduction of a certain structure. In 
historical analysis this will be regarded as the
26. Laszlo, E. (1972), Introduction to Systems Philosophy, p. 
101.
27. Parsons, T. (1961), «A Paradigm for the Analysis of Social 
Systems and Change», Theories of Society, Parsons, T., Shils, E.A. 
et al. (eds.), 1961.
28. Scur, G.S. (1966), «On Some General Categories of 
Linguistics», General Systems, 1966, p. 149.
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minimum, but in structural analysis as the maximum 
specific time of the system.
Social structure assumes a certain period of time 
and abstracts repetitive behaviour from it. Macro­
time refers to periods so long as to invalidate a given 
social structural schema. Micro-time refers to periods 
too short to invalidate a given social structural 
schema.
It is meaningless to speak of the structure of a 
system. When can a set of relations amongst systemic 
elements be said to be relatively fixed and therefore a 
structure? One can only say that structure is exhi­
bited for the period chosen.29
homologies and isomorphisms
Bertalanffy makes the claim:
We can ask for principles applying to systems in general, irrespec­
tive of whether they are of physical, biological or sociological na­
ture. If we pose this question and consistently define the concept of 
a system, we find that models, principles, and laws exist which 
apply to generalized systems irrespective of their particular kind.30
According to Bertalanffy, the logical homology or 
structural correspondence of systems gives rise to 
isomorphic laws in different fields.31
Bertalanffy maintains, and is followed in this by A. 
Rapoport,32 that the classification of systems may be 
based on mathematical homologies, in particular, 
isomorphisms. According to GST, classifications of 
systems may be derived from classifications of 
mathematical models. If a system is specified as a 
particular mathematical model, it is seen to be 
isomorphic to all systems specified in terms of the 
same type. To the extent that a system of equations 
underlies disparate phenomena, these phenomena 
must exhibit homological laws. Homologous vari­
ables or parameters may be found in two or more 
isomorphic models. Terms for such homologous vari­
ables and parameters must play the same part in the 
respective theories.
It is held that knowledge from disparate disciplines 
may be integrated by the utilization of mathematical 
homologies. It has been pointed out, however, that 
isomorphisms are incapable of expressing the 
specificity of systems objects under study.33 It is clear 
that laws of nature cannot be derived from the logical
29. Blalock H.M. and Blalock, A.B. (1959), op. cit.
30. Bertalanffy, L. vori(1971), General System Theory, p. 33.
31. Bertalanffy, L. von (1950), op. cit., pp. 138-9.
32. Rapoport, A., «General Systems Theory» in art. «Systems 
Theory», Inter. Encyc. of the Soc. Sciences.
33. Lektorsky, V.A., Sadovsky, V.N. (1960), «On the Princi­
ples of Systems Research», General Systems, Vol. V. 1960, p. 174.
and mathematical homologies of systems.34 The 
claim that laws of nature could be discovered in this 
way led Ashby to remark:
... this discipline (GST) always seemed to me to be uncertain 
whether it was dealing with physical systems, and therefore tied to 
whatever the real world provides, or with mathematical systems, in 
which the sole demand is that the work shall be free from internal 
contradictions.35
It is true that mathematical structures created to 
represent reality contain deductive consequences, 
but the status of these deductive consequences as 
laws of nature depends on their success in charac­
terizing reality and not on their role in a mathemati­
cal structure.36
E. Laszlo, on the basis of GST, assumes the univer­
sal existence of socio-cybernetic processes,37 but 
whether or not a given social system is a cybernetic 
system is a question which can only be answered by 
inspection.
Hempel points out that a study of systems in gen­
eral would have to investigate all possible types of 
functional relationships, and that although systems 
laws would constitute a subclass of these, there would 
be no way of identifying them.
Blauberg and Yudin state:
As long as the general systems theory was interpreted in scientific 
terms exclusively (in the sense of the most general theory of 
systems), the doubts in the scientific productivity of such a theory 
were quite legitimate.38
They go on to state that the subject-matter of gen­
eral systems theory, in their conception, is the com­
plex of systems theories. However, they are in no 
position to legislate and general systems theory must 
be judged according to the way it is presented by its 
disciples.
classification of systems
Systems havé been classified according to type of 
system-environment interaction as follows:
1. open and closed systems 2. absolutely closed sys­
tems, relatively closed systems and open systems (G. 
Klir) 3. relatively open and relatively closed systems.
34. Ervin Laszlo in Bertalanffy, L. von (1975), Perspectives on 
General Systems Theory, p. 11 et seq. argues that Bertalanffy 
created, not a falsifiable theory, but a new perspective. This would 
be a complete answer to his critics if it were true, but unfortunately 
it is not.
35. Ashby, W.R. (1968), «Principles of the Self-Organizing 
System», in Modern Systems Research for the Behavioral Scientists, 
Buckley, W. (ed.), 1968, p. 10.
36. Berlinski, D. (1976), On Systems Analysis, p. 10.
37. Laszlo, E. (1972), Introduction to Systems Philosophy, p. 
102 et seq.
38. Blauberg, I.V. and Yudin, E. (1977) in Blauberg, I.V. et al., 
op. cit., p. 291.
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Systems may also be classified according to the on­
tological status of their elements.
To Bertalanffy, an open system is one having a 
continual inflow and outflow of both matter and 
energy, whilst a closed system is one having neither 
inflow nor outflow of matter but having the possibil­
ity of energy exchange. Thus, such a system is not 
completely closed.
Under certain conditions an open system may 
reach a flow equilibrium or steady state, i.e., a system 
state in which macroscopic quantities are constant 
but microscopic processes of input and output go on 
continuously. An open system in a steady state is able 
to perform work. Open systems, unlike closed sys­
tems, are characterized by equifinality, the steady 
state, if reached, being independent of the initial 
conditions.
To Parsons, an open system, unlike a closed sys­
tem, is one affected by changes in its environment. It 
is engaged in processes of interchange with its envi­
ronment, and may be seen as a subsystem which is 
dependent on other subsystems for essential inputs.39
P.A. Weiss maintains that all systems are open sys­
tems. As he puts it:
Basically all systems must be expected to be open somewhere 
somehow.
But he holds that practical considerations demand 
that some systems be treated as closed:
... on practical considerations, we accept (of systems) their putative 
deviations from absolute autonomy as «negligible» (negligible; not 
non-existent), treat them as «essentially» autonomous, and call 
them «closed» systems.
According to Weiss, if we find that we have drawn 
the system boundary in such a way as to omit some 
«essential» interrelation formerly regarded as 
«negligible», we can always correct our mistake by 
extending the boundary so as to include it.40
G. Klir 41 divides systems into: 1. absolutely closed 
systems: systems without system-environment in­
teraction; 2. relatively closed systems: systems with 
system-environment interaction limited to certain in­
puts and outputs; 3. open systems: systems capable 
of receiving and responding to all impacts of the envi­
ronment.
There is no system, however, without system- 
environment interaction and no system is capable of 
receiving and responding to all impacts of the envi­
ronment. The assumption of a reciprocal impact of 
system on environment is invalid.
39. Parsons, T., «Social Systems», in art. «Systems Theory», 
Inter. Encyc. of the Soc. Sciences.
40. Weiss, P.A. in Koestler, A. and Smythies, J.R. (1972), op. 
cit., p. 17.
41. Klir. G., Vallach, M. (1967), Cybernetic Modelling.
When we refer to an open system we always imply 
the property or properties in relation to which we 
regard the system as open. If we use the concepts of 
relatively closed system and relatively open system, 
we recognize, firstly, that a system is only open with 
respect to definite parameters and, secondly, that it 
cannot be completely closed.
Social systems differ according to the ontological 
status of their elements. On the one hand, social sys­
tems may be concrete systems, in which case their 
elements are persons or sets of persons, or, on the 
other hand, abstract or analytic systems, in which 
case their elements are constructs.
This distinction may be used to elucidate Lock­
wood’s distinction between social integration, 
which focuses on the orderly or conflictual relation­
ships between the actors, and system integration, 
which focuses on the orderly or conflictual relation­
ships between the parts of the social system.42
In system integration analysis, unlike in social in­
tegration analysis, social processes which cut across a 
multitude of groups are brought together.43 For ex­
ample, in Parson’s theory all social processes relevant 
to a particular functional problem are brought to­
gether.
teleological explanation
Teleological explanation is accounting for a given 
phenomenon by its being contributory to the goal 
sought or maintained by the system. Teleological ex­
planation is possible without any metaphysical or 
finalistic overtones. It is wrong to suppose that a 
teleological explanation asserts that an effect pre­
cedes its cause. The belief that they would otherwise 
be asserting that an effect precedes its cause has led 
some writers, such as C. G. Hempel and E. Nagel, to 
maintain that «X occurs for the sake of Y» means 
either that X is a sufficient condition for Y, i.e., that 
X will bring about Y, or that X is a necessary condi­
tion for Y, i.e., that Y will not occur without X. A 
teleological explanation of X is that X occurs for the 
sake of Y, with the implication that an alteration in Y 
will bring about an alteration in X, that an alteration 
in the goal will alter the behaviour of the system. The 
alteration in the goal precedes the alteration in the 
behaviour of the system and in the behaviour of the 
system cause precedes effect.
P. Sztompka gives the following account of tele­
ological explanation:
42. Lockwood, D. (1964), «Social Integration and System 
Integration», in Explorations in Social Change, Zollschan, G.K. 
and Hirsch, W. (eds. 1964).
43. Mouzelis, N. (1974), «Social and System Integration», Brit. 
J. Sociol.. Dec. 1974, p. 395.
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If we assume that the system has a built-in mechanism that pushes 
it toward the preferred goal state in spite of changing circum­
stances,i.e., that it has a sort of inner program oriented to that final 
state, then we obtain a solution free from both metaphysical and 
finalistic overtones.44
ontological status of social wholes
Ontological individualism denies reality to social 
wholes. S. Lukes claims that both F.A. Hayek and K. 
Popper accept ontological individualism, but M. 
Lessnoff doubts whether anyone has ever held this 
view.4s It would seem, however, that the view has 
been held and that the holistic controversy, in part, 
concerns it. Hayek maintains that terms designating 
social wholes are really theories about the relations 
of individual events, and that the wholes exist «if and 
to the extent to which» the corresponding theories 
are correct.45 6 To Popper, social wholes are unobserv­
able, theoretical entities comparable to the theoreti­
cal entities of physical science.47
According to H. Spencer:
... it is the permanence of the relations among component parts (of 
a society) which constitutes the individuality of a whole as distin­
guished from the individualities of its parts.48
But permanence of the relations is unnecessary for 
the preservation of the system, although some stabi­
lity is necessary to constitute a persisting system.
S. Andreski affirms the entitivity of social groups, 
holding that an entity can be said to exist if an attri­
bute can be predicated of it which cannot be predi­
cated of any other entity.49
D.T. Campbell points out that it is methodologi­
cally improper to assume that a social aggregate is an 
entity or system, and maintains that the social 
aggregate’s entitivity or systemness is a hypothesis to 
be tested.50 As spatial cohesion is a criterion for the 
attribution of entitivity, there is a tendency for the 
attribution of entitivity to depend on the nature of 
human perception.
The systems approach implies that properties are 
attributable to social wholes. A social system, in this 
view, has irreducible properties of its own.
Popper maintains that there are two meanings of 
whole: (a) a totality, i.e., all the properties or aspects
45. Lessnoff, M. (1974), The Structure of Social Science, p. 7.
46. Hayek, F.A. (1964), The Counter-Revolution of Science, 
pp. 54-5.
47. Popper, K. (1961), The Poverty of Historicism, pp. 135-6.
48. Spencer, H. (1897), Principles of Sociology, p. 447.
49. Andreski, S. (1972), Social Sciences as Sorcery, pp. 183-4.
50. Campbell, D.T. (1958), «Common Fate, Similarity, and
Other Indices of the Status of Aggregates of Persons as Social
Entities», Behavioral Science, 1958, p. 17.
of a thing, together with the interrelations of ele­
ments, (b) certain properties or aspects of a thing 
which make it an organized structure rather than a 
«mere heap». In this case it is appropriate to say that 
«the whole is more than the sum of its parts». «The 
more» does not stand for something in addition to 
the parts, but to their organization. Popper maintains 
that social scientists confuse totalities with Gestalt 
wholes, and assume that social wholes are Gestalt 
wholes. Popper argues that a totality cannot be made 
an object of scientific study because a piece of the 
world may be described by widely different proposi­
tions and that such a list is infinite. All description is 
necessarily selective and we can never grasp the 
«concrete structure of social reality itself».
It is certainly important that social scientists should 
not assume that social aggregates are social wholes. 
But social scientists take a selective interest in social 
aggregates, whether organized or not, and are con­
cerned with those properties which are attributable 
to them.
Popper’s argument is only effective against a par­
ticular form of holism, a metaphysical holism which is 
no longer defended.51
hierarchy
By analytic levels, structural levels, integrative 
levels, or organizational levels, we mean that laws, 
functional relationships, correlations, or associations 
are found to exist between variables or other entities 
each of which subsumes entities at a lower organiza­
tional level and is itself subsumed with others under 
an entity at a higher organizational level. Organiza­
tional levels stand in the relationship of progressive 
inclusiveness and constitute a hierarchy.
E. Laszlo52 represents the progressive inclusive­
ness of systems thus: [(acb)ccjcn.
The levels are cumulative upwards.53
S.F. Nadel points out that the phenomenal proper­
ties of facts on one level disappear on the next lower 
level, so that there is a break, a relevant discon­
tinuity, between one level and the next, each level 
being governed by regularities peculiar to it. This dis­
appearance of the phenomenal properties of facts on 
one level on transition to the next lower level is 
known as phenomenal regression and is the opposite 
of the emergence of new properties on transition to a 
higher level.54
44. Sztompka, P. (1974), System and Function.
51. For Karl Popper’s argument see Section 23 «Criticism of 
Holism», The Poverty of Historicism, 1961.
52. Laszlo, E. (1972), op. cit., p. 52.
53. Feibleman, J.K. (1954), «Theory of Integrative Levels», 
Brit. J. Phil. Sci., May, 1954.
54. Nadel, S.F. (1951), Foundations of Social Anthropology.
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C. Grobstein thinks of the transition from one level 
to the next higher level as a set-superset transition. 
So the entities belonging to a given level ean be rep­
resented as:
S=[A,B,C,...N] . where S is a set, A,B,C,...N are the 
components, R is the sum of the relationships among 
the components. S itself is a component of a set and 
each component is a set.55
Allport maintains that when we are in a position to 
work with an entity that we experience at one level, 
the entity as experienced by us at the next lower level 
disappears.56
However, when working at a given level we are 
able to recognize that the internal structure of the 
entity exists although the internal structure is largely 
irrelevant for operations at this level.
A hierarchical structure is often thought to be an 
entity composed of certain kinds of parts, each of 
which is composed of other kinds of parts, etc. But 
the various kinds of parts of a hierarchical structure 
do not necessarily form a linear order of parts, sub­
parts, sub-sub-parts, etc.
According to R.L. Causey, a hierarchical structure 
is one which involves at least two structural descrip­
tions and at least two genera of parts, the structural 
descriptions being a description of the whole as com­
posed of certain kinds of parts, and a description of at 
least one of these parts as a structure composed of 
certain sub-parts.57 The way in which parts are inte­
grated may vary from one level to another in a 
hierarchically-structured whole.
The nonlinearity of the order constituted by inte­
grative levels has also been pointed out by J.K. 
Feibleman.58
J.K. Feibleman presents the following propositions 
concerning integrative levels:
1. Each level organizes the level or levels below it 
plus one emergent level. 2. Complexity of levels in­
creases upwards. 3. In any organization the higher 
level depends on the lower, i.e., in any object which 
extends over more than one level, which it must do if 
it exists at any level above the physical, the higher 
level depends for its continuance upon the lower. 4. 
In any object which extends over more than one 
level, the lower level is directed by the higher. 5. The 
more integrated an organization, the more extensive 
and severe will be a reverberation. 6. The more com­
plex the organization, the more unstable, and thus 
the time required for a change in organization short­
ens as we ascend the levels. 7. The higher the level,
55. Grosbein, C. (1973), «Hierarchical Order and Neogene­
sis», in Hierarchy Theory, Pattee, H.H. (ed.), 1973.
56. Allport, F.H. (1965), «Logical Complexities of Group 
Activity», in Philosophical Problems of the Social Sciences, Bray- 
brooke, D. (ed.), 1965.
57. Causey, R.L. (1977), Unity of Science, pp. 138-9.
58. Feibleman, J.K. (1954), op. cit.
the smaller its population of instances. From the 
point of view of population, the integrative levels 
form a pyramid. 8. Events at any given level affect 
other levels. 9. It is impossible to reduce the higher 
level to the lower, as each level has its own charac­
teristic structure and emergent properties.
It is a fact that complex systems possess a relatively 
simple structure and are intelligible, which is in ac­
cordance with traditional empiricism with its assump­
tion of simplicity and intelligibility, but is something 
that requires an explanation, in the light of the fact 
that the study of complex systems would suggest a 
degree of complexity leading to unintelligibility.
The explanation is that the dynamics of a complex 
system results in a simplified structuring of that com­
plexity. Those evolving systems survive which be­
come hierarchical. The development of subassemb­
lies leads to a relatively simple structure. The detail 
of the subassemblies is irrelevant to the lower- 
frequency interactions among the larger segments. 
As H.A. Simon puts it:
The loose vertical coupling permits the stable subassemblies to be 
treated as simple givens, whose dynamic behavior is irrelevant to 
assembling the larger structures.59
Only the inputs a subassembly requires and the out­
puts it produces are relevant to the larger aspects of 
system behaviour. Hierarchy enables the components 
at any given level to preserve a measure of indepen­
dence and to adapt to their special aspects of the 
environment without destroying their usefulness to 
the system.
Components at any given level have a functional 
efficacy which is independent of their subcompo­
nents. Complex systems evolve from simple systems 
much more rapidly if there are stable intermediate 
forms.60
Nature is organized in levels because hierarchic 
structures provide the most viable form for any sys­
tem of even moderate complexity.
Views vary as to the ontological status of organiza­
tional levels.
As to the relationship between organizational 
levels and descriptive levels, we have at one extreme 
the view that laws are entirely objective and deter­
mine the organizational levels and at the other ex­
treme the view that whatever the underlying reality 
may be, what we understand by laws are structured 
by the descriptive levels we choose.
It has been held that some of the hierarchies reflect 
the structure of nature and that others are the result 
of convention.
59. Simon, H.A. (1973), «The Organization of Complex 
Systems», in Pattee· H.H. (ed.), (1973), op. cit.
60. Simon, H.A. (1962), «The Architecture of Complexity», 
Proceedings of the Amer. Phil. Soc., 106, 1962.
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Bertalanffy appears to take the realist view:
Reality ... appears as a tremendous hierarchical order of organized 
entities...61
Piaget appears to take the conventionalist view. He 
observes that phenomena are not found to be com­
pletely organized at each level and that «it is the level 
that creates the phenomena».62
systems paradoxes
Systems paradoxes are the result of the mutual 
conditionability of the solution of two problems, i.e., 
the solution of one problem presupposes the solution 
of the other.
The following three systems paradoxes are the 
primary ones. Other systems paradoxes are the result 
of the application of these.
The two problems characterized by mutual con­
ditionability are given after the exposition of each 
paradox.
The paradox of hierarchy6*
Describing an object as a system requires that its 
components can be described as subsystems and that 
it can itself be described as a subsystem of a larger 
system. This results in the paradox of hierarchy.
Describing the components of an object as subsys­
tems presupposes that the subsystems can be de­
scribed as systems and presupposes that the system of 
which they are subsystems can be described as a sys­
tem.
Describing an object as a subsystem of a larger 
system presupposes that the object can be described 
as a system and presupposes that the system of which 
it is a subsystem can be described as a system.
A. the problem of describing a system.
B. the problem of describing a subsystem.
The paradox of wholeness64
A whole can only be understood in terms of its 
parts, but the parts can only be understood in terms 
of the whole.
A. the problem of understanding a whole.
B. the problem of understanding its parts.
61. Bertalanffy, L. von (1950), op. cit., p. 164.
62. Piaget. J. ( 1965). Insights and Illusions in Philosophy, p. 82.
63. See the discussions by V.N. Sadovsky in Blauberg. I. V. et al. 
(1977), op. cit., pp. 270-271 and «Problems of a General Systems 
Theory as a Metatheory», Ratio. June, 1974:33.
64. Compare formulation of paradox by V.N. Sadovsky in 
Blauberg, Iy.etal. (1977), op. cit., pp. 271-272 and in «Problems 
of a General Systems Theory as a Metatheory», Ratio, June, 
1974:33 with that of F. Schelling, Schelling, F. (1957), System des 
transzendentalen Idealismus.
The systems-methodological paradox
The construction of a description of a specific sys­
tem requires the construction of the methodology of 
systems research, but this presupposes the construc­
tion of a description of a specific system.
A. the construction of a description of a specific de­
scription.
B. the construction of the methodology of systems 
research.
As systems paradoxes are the result of the mutual 
conditionability of the solution of two problems, they 
involve the logical circle:
/-A/-B/-A/-B/-A
where A and B represent the two problems.
The interpretation of systems paradoxes
Systems paradoxes may be resolved in various 
ways. The paradox of hierarchy only applies to sys­
tems where hierarchicality is recognized. If hierarchi- 
cality is not recognized, the paradoxicality disap­
pears.
The paradoxicality of wholeness is unconvincing. 
System decomposition may be into elements which 
have been separated and are no longer parts or into 
parts. It is unacceptable that these parts possess the 
wholeness properties of the system under study as the 
wholeness properties of the system are irreducible.
Parts are elements which are integrated in a whole 
and we maintain that each part is related to the rest 
of the whole. Understanding the parts simultaneously 
will mean understanding the whole. The systems- 
methodological paradox requires a temporal resolu­
tion.
Systems paradoxes are neither semantic nor logical 
but are of an intermediate type, as they can neither 
be resolved by specifying the respective semiotic 
rules nor by the exclusion of the source of paradoxi­
cality. Systems paradoxes become partially resolved 
in the process of constructing systems thinking and 
become amenable to a temporal resolution. Problems 
are solved on the basis of preliminary, incomplete 
and partial data.
Introducing temporal parameters, represented by 
subscripts of A and B, we obtain:
/~A,/-Bj/-Ak|-B||-Arn...
functionalism
Functionalism has been conceived very broadly as 
the doctrine that the parts should be related to the 
whole of a society and to one another, but this is not 
in accordance with the views of functionalists.
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The broad conception of functionalism according 
to which functionalism is synonymous with sociologi­
cal analysis and non-functionalism is synonymous 
with reduction or pure description is maintained by 
Kingsley Davis.65 According to K. Davis:
Given its subject, the least it (sociology) could do is to relate the 
parts to the whole of society and to one another.66
K. Davis goes on to say that definitions of func­
tionalism go beyond the relating of a part to the 
specification of how it does this relating, namely, by 
seeing one part as «performing a function for».67 But 
this is just the point. Functionalism is something 
more than the doctrine of the relating of a part.
Merton maintains that in its approach to theory, 
method and data, functionalism is weakest in its ap­
proach to method, whereas Sztompka maintains that 
the importance of functionalism lies in its method.68 
However, Merton is referring to the details of 
method, whereas Sztompka is referring to the 
strategy of theory construction.
Sztompka divides methodological rules into heuris­
tic maxims, empirical techniques and the strategy of 
theory construction and holds that it is in regard to 
the strategy of theory construction that there is a 
functional method.69
R.K. Merton in his codification of functionalism 
isolated three functional postulates, namely, func­
tional unity, universal functionalism and indispensa­
bility.
The postulate of functional unity states that social 
or cultural items are functional for the entire social or 
cultural system. The postulate of universal func­
tionalism states that all social or cultural items fulfil 
social functions. The postulate of indispensability 
states that social or cultural items are indispensable.
Merton advances the following criticisms. He 
points out that the postulate of functional unity is 
often contrary to fact and cannot be posited in ad­
vance of observation and that it even lacks heuristic 
value since it diverts the investigator’s attention from 
possible disparate consequences for diverse social 
groups. Social or cultural items may be functional for 
some groups and dysfunctional for others in the same 
society.
The degree of social integration is an empirical 
question and we should be prepared to find a range 
of degrees of social integration. That all societies
65. Davis, K. (1959), «The Myth of Functional Analysis as a 
Special Method in Sociology and Anthropology», Am. Soc. Rev., 
Dec.. ODS), p. 757.
66. Davis, K. (1959), op. cit., p. 759.
67. Davis, K. (1959), op. cit., p, 758.
68. Sztompka, P. (1974), op. cit., p. 44.
69. Merton, R.K. (1968), «Manifest and Latent Functions»,
Social Theory and Social Structure.
have some degree of integration is a matter of defini­
tion.
The postulate of universal functionalism may di­
vert attention from a range of non-functional conse­
quences óf existing cultural forms. A more useful as­
sumption would be that persisting cultural forms 
have a net balance of functional consequences. The 
postulate of indispensability involves two proposi­
tions, the indispensability of certain functions, which 
gives rise to the concept of functional necessity or 
functional prerequisites, and the indispensability of 
existing social and cultural forms, which gives rise to 
the concept of functional alternatives, functional 
equivalents, or functional substitutes.
Just as the same item may have multiple functions, 
so may the same function be diversely fulfilled by 
alternative items. Structural constraint is the limita­
tion upon the variation in the items which can fulfil 
designated functions. Functional analysis requires a 
specification of the units for which a given social or 
cultural item is functional. Functional analysis must 
recognize that a given item may have diverse conse­
quences, functional and dysfunctional, for in dividuals, 
subgroups, and the more inclusive social and cultural 
systems.
Merton states:
functional analysis has no intrinsic commitment to an ideological 
position.70
Conservative ideological implications have been at­
tributed to functionalism by some writers and radical 
ideological implications have been attributed by 
others.
According to G. Myrdal:
if a thing has a «function» it is good or at least essential.
It therefore follows that:
a description in terms of their functions must lead to a conservative 
ideology.71
Again, H. Hield maintains that functionalists are:
primarily concerned with maintaining a stable, integrated and 
harmonious social equilibrium.72
La Piere, on the other hand, suggests that functional 
analysis is inherently critical in outlook:
If an important aspect of any social structure is its functions it 
follows that no structure can be judged in terms of structure alone. 
As a social structure it has no inherent value, since its functional 
value will vary from time to time and from place to place.73
70. Merton. R.K. (1968), op. cit., p. 108.
71. Myrdal, G. (1955), An American Dilemma, II 1053.
72. Hield, H. (1954), «The Study of Change in Social Science», 
Brit. J. Sociol., March, 1954, p. I.
73. LaPiere, R. (1938), Collective Behavior, pp. 55-56.
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When we turn to the function of the system as a 
whole, we have to ask the question: Is the system 
functional to those who operate it? Bredemeier sug­
gests that functional analysis loses its point if it fails 
to hold in view the needs induced in the actors by the 
normative definitions of the dominant culture.74
According to R. Fletcher, the ahistorical bias in 
functionalism is the result of anthropologists, who 
were rebelling against conjectural history, selecting 
the functional aspect and neglecting the historical as­
pect of Durkheim’s system.75 Sztompka does not re­
gard the ahistorical bias as a necessary characteristic 
of functionalism.
A systems model may generate a number of func­
tional models, but a systems model is not derivable 
from a set of functional models. A purely functional 
approach to a social system makes it possible to study 
those connections which correspond to the functions 
chosen, but only some of the numerous connections 
in the social system are thereby registered.
Functionalism possesses no recognized methods 
for identifying and decomposing the system, so that 
the decomposition carried out may not be the most 
adequate one, and as different decompositions yield 
different structures, the initial structure which is cho­
sen arbitrarily, is allowed to determine the decom­
position.
The unconvincing attribution of functions to all the 
elements studied in a functional analysis is partly the 
result of attempting to synthesize elements that are 
not the result of a methodical decomposition.
structuralism
The «structural» approach
The term «structure» < L. «structura», has always 
referred to a whole, the parts of the whole and their 
interrelations.
Originally of architectural reference, its use was 
extended to anatomy and grammar. It was intro­
duced into the social sciences by Herbert Spencer. 
Some writers maintain that the biological analogy re­
sulted in a bias towards the study of observable 
parts.76
However, structure always involved an abstraction 
from concrete reality. As Fortes said:
Structure is not immediately visible in the «concrete reality»...
74. Bredemeier, H.C. (1955), «The Methodology of Func­
tionalism'. Am. Socio!. Rev.. April, 195x p. 179.
75. Fletcher, R. (1956), «Functionalism as a Social Theory», 
Socio!. Rev.. July. 1956.
76. See Glucksmann, M. (1974), Structuralist Analysis in Con­
temporary Social Thought, p. 15.
We discern structure in the «concrete reality» of so­
cial events only by virtue of having first established 
the structure by abstraction from the concrete 
reality.77
Nadel conceives an individual relationship as «a 
series of modes of behaviour of A towards B and of B 
towards A», which already involves an abstraction 
from concrete events, and proceeds to a social re­
lationship, «that which a set of individual relation­
ships have in common», by a further process of ab­
straction and conceives of social structure as «a pat­
tern and network of social relationships».78
Radcliffe-Brown conceives of social structure as «a 
set of individual relationships» as distinct from struc­
tural form which is that which a set of individual 
relationships have in common.79
It is clear that only concrete behaviour can be ob­
served, yet Radcliffe-Brown in reference to social re­
lations wrote:
It is on this that we make direct observations.80 
The «structuralist» approach
French structuralism emerged from the concern 
with «getting behind the facts».
There was first the attempt by Durkheim and 
Mauss to discover the essential properties inherent in 
the phenomena studied, which assumed that actors’ 
definitions of social life were inadequate.
Then the Année Sociologique writers, such as 
Mauss, Hertz, Hubert, came to view social structure 
as consisting of principles of operation underlying 
observed data.
In structuralism, as in systems theory, the language 
of levels is employed, but in structuralism «levels» do 
not refer to organizational levels but to what is below 
the surface of observed phenomena. What we find is 
the realist concern with the mechanisms underlying 
observables.
The structuralist approach is based on the distinc­
tion between the most immediate conceptualization 
and reality and the distinction between ideology and 
reality. Structuralism does not imply a distinction be­
tween appearance and reality, but stresses the impor­
tance of going beyond the most immediate concep­
tualization. Structuralism maintains that ideology dif­
ferentially obscures social reality, but that social real­
ity is, nevertheless, accessible.
Global structuralism is concerned with observable 
relations and interactions. The analytic structuralism
77. Fortes, M. (1949), «Time and Social Structure», in Social 
Structure, p. 56.
78. Nadel, S.F. (1957), The Theory of Social Structure.
79. Radcliffe-Brown, A.R. (1959), Structure and Function in 
Primitive Society.
80. Radcliffe-Brown, A.R. (1959), op. cit.
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of Mauss and Lévi-Strauss seeks to explain such em­
pirical systems by postulating «deep structures» from 
which the former are in some way derivable.
The meaning that Lévi-Strauss gives to «structure» 
in his essay on the subject,81 namely, a model 
generating a group of models of the same type, the 
reaction of which to modifications of its elements is 
predictable, is not the same as the meaning he gives 
to it when he uses it in his work. In his study of 
totemism he treats structure, not as a certain type of 
model, but a set of fundamental relations between 
the constituent elements of the phenomenon in 
question.82 Lévi-Strauss sometimes uses the term 
«structure» to refer to the interrelationships found in 
concrete cases, i.e., particular variants, and some­
times to the general case of which they are examples, 
i.e., the «syntax of transformations». The syntax of 
transformations cannot be observed. It is only its 
manifestations which can be observed. It is the con­
cern with «deep structures» which is structuralist as 
opposed to structural. Structures, unlike models, 
are presumed to have an objective existence. Lévi- 
Strauss explicates the concept of structure as fol­
lows:
An arrangement is structured which meets but two conditions: that 
it be a system ruled by an internal cohesiveness and that this cohe­
siveness, inaccessible to observation, in an isolated system, be re­
vealed in the study of transformations through which similar prop­
erties are recognized in apparently different systems.83
Weighting of elements
According to structuralism, the elements of the 
structure and their interrelationships are weighted. In 
some forms of functionalism, the systemic elements 
are weighted and in other forms of functionalism they 
are unweighted.
Parsonian doctrine affirms the interdependence of 
systemic parts but leaves them unweighted and does 
not affirm the dominance of any one part. Parsonian 
practice, on the other hand, introduces weighting.84
conclusion
A survey of systems theory in the social sciences 
leads to the following propositions.
1. Systems theory, functionalism and structuralism 
reveal convergences. Organization is to be found not 
only in systems but also in structures. Organization 
varies not only in systems but also in structures. 
Wholes are decomposable into both systems and
81. Lévi-Strauss, C. (1968), «Social Structure» in Structural 
Anthropology, Vol. I.
82. Lévi-Strauss, C. (ly64), Totemism.
83. Lévi-Strauss, C. (1973), Structural Anthropology, Vol. II, 
p. 18.
84. Gouldner, A.W. (1970), The Coming Crisis in Western 
Sociology.
structures and are decomposable into both in differ­
ent ways. Functions are attributed not only to sys­
temic parts but also to structural parts. Both systems 
theory and structuralism are anti-reductionist. Both 
systems theory and structuralism reject the idea of 
ungenerated wholes. Both systems and structures, in 
the structuralist sense, are characterized by non- 
summativity of elements and possess irreducible 
wholeness properties. Systems theory, functionalism 
and structuralism all encourage quantification.
2. The units isolated by observation do not neces­
sarily correspond to the structural elements in struc­
turalism or to the structural or systemic elements of 
some other approach.
3. The systems approach does not exclude other 
approaches, as science continually generates new ap­
proaches.
4. Systems theory cannot be dismissed as an un­
fortunate aberration, an unsuccessful attempt to 
apply the rigour of the physical sciences to social and 
biological phenomena.85
5. The use of systems theory demands caution and 
judgment is required to avoid extravagant applica­
tions.
6. Caution is required to avoid the inappropriate 
operational specification of systems terms in the so­
cial sciences.
7. A fit between the teleological model and social 
reality cannot be assumed. A given social system may 
not be teleological.
8. The systems approach, through its applicability 
to the different levels of reality, encourages the unity 
of science.
9. It is important to realize that a system may be in 
disequilibrium.
10. Systems theory, through being anti­
reductionist, permits the study of higher-level 
phenomena which might otherwise be ignored and 
which would disappear under a reductionist 
programme.86
11. The systems approach implies that there is a 
fallacy of composition, i.e., that the inference from 
distributive to collective predication is invalid.
12. Systems theory bridges the gap between the 
social and non-social by treating the social as part of 
a hierarchically-structured reality.
13. Systems theory is found within both the Marx­
ian and non-Marxian frameworks.87
85. See Berlinski, D.J. (1976), On Systems Analysis.
86. P.A. Weiss speaks of: «... the monopolistic position often 
taken there (in molecular biology), which starves out some of the 
equally important but sorely neglected problem areas in biology». 
(Weiss, P.A. in Beyond Reductionism, Koestler, A. & Smythies, 
J.R. (eds), p. 48). Organismic and population biology are legiti­
mate domains which are distinct from, although linked with, cellu­
lar and molecular biology.
87. See Sztompka, P. (1974), System and Function.
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14. The systems approach is sufficiently wide to 
accomodate the requirements of differing fields with 
their differing degrees of integration and differing 
relations between organizational levels.
15. Just as the existence of defects in social inves­
tigations does not prove that it is impossible to effec­
tively employ rigorous methods, so the possibility of 
misapplying systems theory does not invalidate the 
systems approach in the social sciences.88
88. Both R.R. Brown in Rules and Laws in Sociology (1973)
and E. Ions in Against Behaviouralism (1977) claim to have found 
defects in various social investigations. R.R. Brown is puzzled by 
the presence of these defects, but remains convinced of the scien- 
tificity of his subject, while E. Ions regards the defects as invalidat­
ing the use of rigorous methods in the social sciences. Likewise, 
D.J. Berlinski in On Systems Analysis (1976) regards the defects 
he finds in J.W. Forrester’s Urban Dynamics (1969) as invalidating 
the application of systems theory in the social sciences. Scientific 
aims are not invalidated by present lack of achievement. 
Berlinski’s reference to «the gap that inexorably opens between 
the conception and the execution of a set of intellectual ambitions» 
does not invalidate scientific aims.
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